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Resource allocation at the macro level is a major concern of govern­
ment fiscal policy in Japan as in other nations. Three inter-related types 
of resource allocation problems may be distinguished. One is to ensure that 
labor and capital resources are fully used -- the compensatory finance pro­
blem of balancing aggregate demand with futl capacity supply consonant 
with price level stability objectives. While primarily a business cycle 
problem it also has implications for growth. 
A second problem is to determine and provide for the proper allocation 
of resources between the public sector and the private sector. Essentially 
it involves the trade-off between the provision of public goods and of 
private goods. -Related to this, third, is the problem of the allocation 
of resources between consumption and investment. This is essentially the 
issue of the optimum rate of growth. The government influences not only 
private consumption, saving, and investment but of course determines the 
rate of public consumption·, saving, and investment. The government has a 
variety of instruments to implement its policies -- taxation, expenditures 
(on goods and services, and on transfer pay~ents), and borrowing and lending. 
The purpose of this paper is to focus on the somewhat more narrow 
problem of financing of the government sector in postwar Japan, rather than 
directly examining these broad issues. Nonetheless, the analysis is pre­
dicated upon this broader policy framework, and will tackle various facets 
of the broader problems, albeit from occasionally indirect approaches. The 
main emphasis is on net relationship5-- government investment and its fi-
.nancing -- with little discussion of government transfer payments or current 





first present and discuss the data on public sector investment and its 
financing. Following a brief excursion into intra-governmental financing, 
turn to certain contemporary policy issues emanating from the government's in­
vestment program and its financing. Throughout I use the Japanese national in­
come definition of the government sector, which includes central and local 
{prefectural and municipal) governments and, at each level, general govern­
ment anci government enterprise. "Government" is thus synonomous with "public 
sector, 11 though in terms of policy making it refers mainly to the central level. 
Less use is made of the Minis try of Finance legal and budgetary classification 
of general account, special accounts, and government corporations, since they 
involve considerable overlapping and d~plication on a non-consolidated basis. 
1The new national incoir.e estimates are used wherever possible. Data are·=in 
current prices, unless otherwise noted. 
I 
As indicated in Table 1, government investment has •grown rapidly in the 
postwar period (increasing almost seven-fold between 1952-1964, and 4-1/2 times 
in real terms), with some cyclical and erratic fluctuation. Moreover, the 
investment share in the government's total purchase of goods and services has 
risen dramatically from the 1952 level of 39 percent to the present level of 
approximately 53 per cent. Because GNP and ~grDss domestic investment has also 
grown rapidly arid with cyclical swings, the share of government investment in 
them has been rather more stable. Since 1957, however, the trend of the 
govemEent investment/GNP ratio has been strikingly upwards, rising from 6.7 
percent to 10 per cent. (The 1965 ratio will be considerably higher). 



















Table 1. Government Gross Investment and Saving
(current prices, amounts in billion yen) 
I N V E S T ME N T (I) SAVING (S) 
% Govt.
Annual Purchase Annual
Rate Goods & % % Gross • Rate % Covt. % % GrossAmount Increase Services Invest.Qfil: Amount Increase Revenues Qi! .Savin~ I-S 
398.8 -- 38.8 6.6 25.0 523.1 -- 40.l 8.6 32.7 -124 .3525.2 31.7 41.3 7.5 32.4 479 .1 - 8.4 33.3 6.9 29.5595.2 13.3 41. 7 7.6 31.6 455.8 4.9 46.l 
747.9 25.7 45.7 
29.0 5.8 24.2 139.48.8 34.0 464.8 2.0 28.2 5.5 21.2666.7 -10.9 42.l 283.17.0 .24.7 619.9 33.4 34.0 6.5 23.0742.3 11.3 42.6 46.8 
891.2 20.1 44.4 
6.7 20.6 849.3 37.0 39.4 7.7 23.6 -107.07.9 27.3 708.9 -16.5 31.3 6.3 21.71,080.2 21.2 47.7 182.38.4 26.6 901.0 27.1 35.8 7.0 22.21,294.4 19.8 49.4 179.28.5 24.1 1>303.8 44.7 41.6 8.6 2l;. 31,532.0 18.4 - 9.4 
2,085. l; 36.1 
49.7 8.3 21.1 1>796.5 37.8 45.8 9.7 24.8 -264.553. 7 10.0 27.4 1,977.8 10.1 44.32,353.2 12.8 9.5 26.0 107.652.3 10.0 28.6 2,163.7 9.4 41.92,692.5 14.4 9.2 26.3 189.552.8 9.7 26.0 2,108.1 - 3.6 37.1 7.6 20.4 584.4 
New national income statistics, Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Monthly, March 1966. Savingsare adjusted to include (old) estimates of central government capital consumption allowancesplus local government capital consumption allowances estimated from Ministry of Home ~ffairsworksheets; the 1964 estimate is preliminary. 
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For the post~ar period as a whole private aggregate demand, based on 
booming private fixed investment demand, has been sufficiently strong that the 
government has not needed to use compensatory fiscal policy to generate de-
mand through deficit spending. Consequently, public sector demand for re­
sources has been competitive with private demand. The exceptions has been the 
recession periods of 1954, 1957-5,8, 1962, and 1965, but these represent de­
liberate restrictions of aggregate demand to restore balance of payments equili­
brium. 
The government reaction to the public-private competition in the use of 
resources at full capacity levels and rates of growth of output has been, at 
least until 1963, to favor the private sector, notably business fixed invest­
ment. Government total purchases of goods and services as a proportion of GNP 
(17-19 per cent) did not display any rising trend, unlike many other indus­
trial nations. The government also encouraged by fiscal and financial means 
the relative shift within the private sector from personal consumption to 
business investment, in order to promote growth. 
While holding the growth of its expenditures to the rate of growth of 
~ggregate demand, the government contributed to the growth process not only by 
shifting relatively from government consumption to government investment, but 
also by allocating its investment mainly to areas complementary to private 
production of consumer goods and services -- such as roads, urban water and 
sewage systems, and housing ..:,_ the government until recently did t:1.ot increase • 
its relative 1.allocation of investment to these areas. In other words, in 
order to support economic growth by means increases in private business invest-
--5--
ment, industrial capacity and output, the government restrained the production 
of public consumption goods and of housing relative to demand more than any 
restriction of private production of consumer goods and services, 
A further implication of strong private aggregate demand was that the 
government had to finance its investment by the least ·demand-creating method. 
Governments can pay for their gross investment (and other expenditures) by 
fiscal means through internal financing (gross saving) or by financial means 
through external borrowing .~ram households, private financial institutions, the 
central bank, or from abroad. Government saving out of tax and non-tax revenues 
is the least demand-creating method, followed in order by borrowing from indi-
viduals, from financial institutions, and from the central bank. 1 In Japan 
the domestic demand effect of government foreign borrowing is the same as 
borrowing from the Bank of Japan, since t_he government converts the foreign 
exchange received into yen by selling either the foreign exchange foreignor 
exchange bills to the central bank. 
As is clear from Tables 1 and 2, in Japan the government has relied 
heavily its . to f ' . . In the early post-on own savings inance its' investment ( I) 
2 
war years government saving was greater than investment; inflation came not 
from government expenditures but from the central_ bank-financed lending of 
government financial institutions. Thereafter government investment has grown 
1. If we as"sume that any increase in aggregate demand from the financing 
of government investment in a ful.l resource employment economy tends to in- • 
crease private demand relative to public and to increase total consumption
relative to investment, then this same sequence applies to these allocations as 
well, 
2. Government saving consists of the surplus on current account (tax
and non-tax revenues including government enterprise profits less current · 
purchases of goods and services, subsidies, and transfer payments) and capital
consumption allowances of government enterprise. 
6 
Table 2 
Government Investment-Savings Gap 
(current prices, amounts in billion yen) 
National Income 
Estimate 








































































Sources: Table 1 and Bank of Japan flow of funds data, adjusted as 
indicate·d in notes to Table 3. 
· a: Net financial surplus or deficit 
. . 
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more rapidly than government saving, with saving lagging increasingly behind 
investment since 1962. Both saving and investment are highly influenced by 
the business cycle. Government saving has risen rapidly in boom periods be­
cause government reVEnues increased more than expected and therefore than 
budgeted current account expenditures. Thus, as indicated in Table 2, the 
I - S gap disappeared in the late stages of earlier booms, and increased in re­
cession. The 1964 experience is significant in that the 1-S gap widened rather 
than narrowing. Cumulatively, government saving financed 92.0 per cent of 
government investment between 1952-1964, but declining to 87 .6 per cent for 
1962-1964, and less if 1965 were included. 
An extremely important reason for this high share of internal financing 
despite rapid growth of investment is that the government's tax system is 
highly elastic relative to the growth of GNP. 1 This has enabled the govern-
ment to follow simultaneously several politic.ally attractive courses: regular 
tax rate reductions, increases in current expenditures, increases in investment, 
and little obvious increase in borrowing (until 1965). The government's pro­
pensity to save out its actual current. revenue (G) has been high. A simple 
least-squares regression using the new national income data for 1954-1964 pro­
vides the following results: 
S = 6.267 + 0.3974G l = .911 
(0.0375) d = 1.060 
In other words, the marginal propensity to save is almost 40 per-cent. 
1. It is difficult to obtain precise elasticity estimates, since the govern­
ment changes tax rates virtually every year. Ishi estimates a weighted average
elasticity to national income of direct taxes of 1.58 and indirect taxes of .990;
cf. Ishi Hiromi tsu, "Sozei Danryokusei no I chi Keisoku" (A measurement of Tax 
Elasticity), Hitotsubashi Ronso, Vol. 52, No. 5 (November 1964). In addition 
income has shifted 1elatively relative to corporate business, which has a 
higher~tax rate, 
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Thus, between 1954-1964 only 8 per cent of government investment had to . 
be financed from external sources. In other words, the government relied only 
to this extent on the net voluntary transfer of claims on resoo~ces from outside 
the public sector. The amount and degree of external financing are measured by 
the investment-savings gap in the first two columns of Table 2. 1 Two points 
should be made. First, consolidated at all levels the government has been a 
net borrower continuously (with cyclical exceptions only) since 1952. Second, 
the amount of government borrowing has been rising sharply since 1962, culminating 
in the 1965 decision to sell new issues of government debentures to households 
and financial institutions. This more recent trend is clearly related to the 
increased share of government investment in GNP. 
One procedure to est:i.mate government reliance on external borrowing is to 
regress the net issue of government securities (Y) on government investment and 
service: 
Y = a + a1 I+ a2s. 0 
Two estimates were made. The first (Y ) had as the dependent variable net1 
long-term bond issue (mainly local governments and government corporations), 
while the second (Y ) included in addition sho).'."t-term government bills. The2 
results were: 
yl = -50 .685 + .0932 I + .02943 S l = .927 
(.0494) (.0535) d = 2.45 
2Y = -8,566 +- .6932 I - .7038S R_ = .8342 
(.1746) (.1894) d = 2.43 
The coefficients in the first equation are not really significant, especially 
for S, despite the good fit. The sign for S seems wrong. This, however, may 
be explained by the tendency for local government and government enterprise 
1. The flow of funds data, which provide an alternative estimate of the I-S 
gap from the net financial deficit of the public sector, underestimate the gap re­
lative to the national income data for earlier years, but overestimate for 1961-
'196l1, It is unclear as to which is the better estimate; fortunately, the di­
vergence appears to be relatively decreasing. 
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investment, and bond issue to finance it, to grow most rapidly in a boom, when 
I 
S a'iso is growing rapidly, and to slow down, together with Sin the recession. 
The second equation looks much better. However, Sand I are highly 
correlated and have virtually the same coefficients; this equation really indi­
cates that government security issue increases by • 7 times the increase in the 
I - S gap. But the implied causal relationship is probably spurious. Most of 
the change in government security issue is in short-term bills. At the height 
of the boom the I - S gap narrows (Table 2) because of the officially un­
anticipated increase in saving. Coincidentally the government loses foreig~ 
exchange reserves due to balance of payments problems; it can therefore reduce 
its foreign exchange bill sales to the Bank of Japan. Thec.pposite happens 
both to saving and to foreign exchange reserves in the recession. 
The external sources of the·financing of government investment are esti­
mated from flow of funds data, and appear in Table 3. Of the cumulative total 
borrowed by the government between 1954-1964, 68.9 per cent came from the pri­
vate sector, 44.2 per cent from the Bank of Japan (almost all in 1964), and 
-13 .1 per cent from abroad (i.e., the government was a net foreign lender). 
Within the private sector the government borrowed on a net basis from house­
holds and financial institutions, and while lending to corporate business. 
Government borrowing from the Bank of Japan is measured by direct trans-
. 1actions. Hence, government borrowing from the private sector which is in 
1. Government foreign exchange holdings and their financing are consoli­
dated to the Bank of Japan sector in order to focus on government borrowing
for purposes other than holding foreign exchange. 
Table 3 
I External Sources of Government Finance, 1954-1964 • 
~ (billion yen) 
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 . 1961 1962 1963 1964 
From Private 
Sector (A) 77.5 20.5 59.1 23.3 - 37.1 - 18.9 25.1 31.0 169.5 256.3 199.9 '" Households 
l~.eceipts from 143.9 140.7 175.2 131.2 176.5 238.3 272.0 294.9 391.1 396.0 467.0 
Loans to 59.7 36.6 51.0 66.3 89.8 34.8 90.0 103.2 120.2 114.2 150.9 
net 84.2 104.l 124.2 114.4 86.7 153.5 182.0 191. 7 270.9 231.8 316.1 
Corporate nusiness 
P..eceints from 2.9 3.9 - 5.1 2.7 16.9 10..8 33.3 53.1 79.8 74.2 73.6 
Loans to 102.1 90.3 84.9 122.3 124.0 147.8 166.4 210.5 267.6 285.0 406.8 
l-Jet - 99.2 -86.4 -90.0 -119.6 -107.1 -137.0 -133.1 -157.4 -187.8 -210.s -333.2
Financial Instit, 
·Receipts from 50.9 56.1 68.1 48.2 29.1 50.2 94.3 128.3 144.0 267.S 302. 6 ..
Loans to - 41.6 53.3 43.2 19.7 45.~ 35.6 118.1 131.6 57.6 82.5 85.6 
::Jet 92.5 2.8 24.9 28.5 - 16.7 - 35.4 - 23.8 - 3.3 86.4 185.3 217.0 
From Bank of 
Japan (E) 170.7 261.8 -74.4 -146.0 77.1 120.6 -117.6 -220.1 - 19.6 20.2 444.3 
From Abroad (C) - 82.7 -98.4. 6,6 24.2 - 15.0 - 23.3 - 10.0 30.5- 3.4 ll.5 7.0 
Total (A+l.J+C) 165.5 1S3.9 - 8,7 98.5- 25.0 78.4 -102.5 -192.5 180.4" 288.0 651.2 
Source: Based on Bank of Japan :t"low of funds d4t~ plus data on local frOvernment loans and equity to private
business corporations. . 
1Jote: The government sector includes central and loc2l ~overnment, government enterprises, and ~overn­
Ment financial inscitutions, but excludes ~overnnent holdings of forei~n exchan~e and coin 
production (both of which are consolidc!-ted into the Bank of Japan sector). 
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effect financed by the central bank credit to the private sector is excluded. 
(It would be fruitless to include it, since in that case all government domes­
tic borrowing could be regarded as central bank financed). Government direct 
reliance on central bank credit has been short-term, relatively small, and 
seasonal or cyclical in nature. The· government is legally restricted ·in its 
borrowing from the Bank of Japan to short-term bills. Much has been to finance 
increases in government purchases of domestically produced rice; this seasonal 
phenomenon results in increased net borrowing on a calendar year basis in years 
of good rice crops. The government was able to pile up sufficient liquidity 
during 1960-1962 from the small I-S gaps and increasing net borrowings from 
the private sector that it coul_d finanC:e its own activities and pay off bills 
held by the BAnk of Japan as they matured. In 1964 it financed the sharply 
widening l-S gap by increased bill sales to the Bank of Japan. 
I was surprised to find that the go·vernment has been a net foreign lender 
rather than borrower. Evidence suggests that the government's net foreign 
debt has declined fromabout ¥184 billion ($501 million) at the end of 1953 
to ¥34 billion ($95 million) at the end of 1964.1 On a gross basis the centra~ 
government, a few local governments (Tokyo, Osaka), and government agencies 
(Japan Development Bank, Nippon Telephone & Telegraph Public Corporation) have 
borrowed abroad long-term by such means as loans· from the World Bank, the U.S. 
Export-Import Bank, and bond issues, At the same time the central government 
and its agencies have lent long-term even mor_e abroad, mainly loans by the 
1. The foreign borrowing estimates are the least reliable, though I 
regard them as reasonably accurate. The Bank of Japan has not made available 
sectoral foreign asset and liability stock figures since 1959, though some 
flow data are available, These estimates are derived from adjustments of 
_stocks by flow data. Since the basis of estimation has changed slightly, since 
gold and foreign exchange are facluded in foreign borrowings data (though not 
here), and since the Bank of Japan data are deliberately vague on these 
. matters, some errors may have resulted. 
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-- $1,556 millionExport-Import Bank of Japan (which increased by ¥416 billion 
between the ends of 1953 and 1964) and subscriptions to such international or­
ganizations as the IMF, World Bank, and IDA. 
The net· flows between government and the private sector summarize and 
mask somewhat the much larger gross flows, which are extensive and compli~ 
cated. The government, in addition to its current spending, investing and 
saving activities, is a large financial intermediary, operating through a 
variety of government financial institutions. In some items it may be possi­
ble to trace government borrowing directly to those units engaging ir. govern­
ment investment; examples are debentures solq by central government public 
corporations to individuais and business corporations using their services 
and to. financj_al institutions, and local government bond sales to and loans 
from financial institutions. Host, however, become mingled with other funds 
and passed through several intermediaries before investment expenditures 
actually occur. 
The most notable example is individual postal savings and post-office 
annuities and life insurance. These net flows are the largest single and · 
also most routine source of government borrowing. The administrative procedure 
is to mingle the postal savings with other funds administered by the Trust 
Fund Bureau. These funds, along with postal annuity and life insurance funds 
and others, are then used to finance the government's Investment and L~an Pro­
gram. The Program ~ODSists of transfers to local governments and eentral 
government enterprise activities by means of loans and bond purchase, and 
loans to the private s~ctor through government financial institutions and bond 
purchase. 
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·However, there is a surprisingly close correlation between the net flow 
of postal savings, annuities and life insurance (P) and net government loans (L) 
to corporate (and to a lesser extent unincorporated) enterprise. 
Using 1954-1964 flow of funds data, 
2L = -64.3 + 1.19 P R = .9106 
(O .0155) d = 1.524 
This implies that government lending activity depends mainly upon the'inflow 
of postal savings and life insurance. It suggests that Minis try of Finance 
decision-makers employ, perhaps not explicitly, some such rule of thumb 
criterion in preparing the Investment and Loan Program. If so, then government 
financial interm~diation is separated from the operation of fiscal policy. 
We might also note that since government financial institutions lend primarily 
to big business, in this way saving of small savers is channelled on a pre­
ferential basis to large-scale enterprises .. 
Even on a net basis among the household, corporate business, and financial 
institution subsectors of the private sector, the government cumulatively 
between 195!•-1964 received 163.2 per cent of its total net borrowings (in­
cluding the Bank of Japan) from households, made loans equivalent to 142.0 
per cent of its borrowings to the corporate sector, and received 47.7 per 
cent of its borrowings from financial institutions. In other words, the 
government borrowed considerably more for purposes of relending than for fi-
-
nancing its own investment. On a gross basis the central government sold 
virtually none of its bills or bonds to the private sector; it was legally 
restricted in its bond issue, and kept its bill rate uncompetitively low since 
it could rely upon their purchase by the Bank of Japan. The most important 
·-14-
flows between private and government sectors have been postal savings and 
life insurance, public corporation and local government bond issues, govern­
ment loans to business, and purchase of bank bonds. 
Analysis of the ~ffects of government financial intermediation on the amount 
of private saving and on the cornpos-ition of the total allocation of investment 
funds is beyond the scope of this paper. We may note.,that the net increase 
be.tween, 1954-1964 in governlJlent loans to corporate._ enterprise and households 
was only 11.7 per cent of the loan increase by private financial institutions. 
Government loans have been concentrated, however, to relatively few industries; 
for example, the electric power industry received 35 per cent of its loans 
from the Japan Development Bank, and the shipping industry (perhaps the only 
unprofitable industry in postwar Japan) some 57 per cent. 
II 
Thus far I have treated the government as a single homogeneous unit. In 
terms of the locus of decision-making on tax, expenditure, and financial 
policies this is reasonable, since the central government strongly influences 
if not actually determining local government policies as well as those of 
central government enterprises. Huch of the power on these matters is con­
centrated in the Hinistry of Finance. 
An important reason for such concentration of power at the central level 
is the imbalance between expenditures and internal sources of financing of 
local governments and government enterprises. While in aggregate the public 
sector may finance most of its investment from its own saving, when dis­
aggregated by levels of government or by type of activity (general government 
versus government enterprise), the. central government has a large surplus of 
-15-
revenues over expenditures, local governments have excess expenditures, while 
government enterprise investment grows more rapidly than their internal 
generation of funds. 
The drastic central-local government revenue-expenditure imbalance is 
1clear from the data in Table 4. More detailed data on the level of govern­
ment investment and their sources of financing are provided in Table 5. 2 The 
central government engages in 40-45 per cent of total public sector invest­
ment, but finances 55-60 per cent of it.3 These are net flows; gross flows 
are even larger since local governments finance portions of certain central 
government investment projects. More important, central government financing 
is under-estimated since certain tax receipts which actually were collected 
at the central level are attributed to local governments. 
1. The national income statistics are inadequate for this breakdown 
because they attribute to the central government much investment actually 
done at local levels. I calculate central government investment in the old 
national income statistics to be overestimated by approximately 45-50 per 
cent, with a corresponding underestimate of local government investment. The 
underestimate in the new national income statistics (for 1955-62) is about 
35 per cent. 
2. Percentages for investment by central government differ slightly 
from Table 4 because inventory investment is excluded and there are slight 
differences in coverage. 
3. This tends to understate the flows, since central government enter­
prise investment is large and is financed at the central level. For general 
(non-enterprise) government investment, the central government does about 
23 per cent and finances about 46 per cent. 
(. 
Table 4 
Share of Central in Total Government 
Revenues and Expenditures 
(in per cent of total) 
Fiscal Purchase of All 
Year Revenues Expenditures Goods & Services Investment 
1952 73.6 41.5 35.5 39.7 











1956 71.9 49o2 41. 7 41.0 
1957 71.9 50.0 41.8 40.2 
1958 71. 7 48.7 41.2 40.7 
1959 72.0 50.6 43.0 43.2 
1960 72.6 50.3 42.1 41.9 
1961 73.0 50.6 42.6 42.3 
1962 71.8 49.7 42.0 40.8 
1963 71.6 47.8 39.5 41.2 
Cumulative 
Average n.o 48.6 41.0 41.l 
Note: Including government enterprise saving and investment. 
Source: Worksheets from forthcor.:iing study on the public sector in postwar
Japan. Expenditures (notably the investment component) are adjusted to the 





Gross Fixed Investment Expenditures arid its Financing 
by Level of Government 
(per cent of total) 
Fiscal 
Year Share Central Prefecture Municipality 
1958 Investment by 39.9 30.6 29.5 
Financed by 56.5 19.8 23.7 
1959 Investment by 42.3 30.6 27.1 
Financed by 58.'7 20.0 21.3 
1960 Investment by 42.3 31.1 26.6 
Financed:. by 58 .O.· 21.9 20.9 
1961 Investment by 46.2 29.8 24.0 
Financed by 59.8 21.0 19.2 
1962 Investment by 41.4 33.6 25.0 
Financed by 55.4 24.3 20.3 
1963 Investment by 44.0 31.2 24.8 
Financed by 57.1 22.7 20.2 
Note: Includes government enterprise, which is financed primarily at same 
level of government.· Central government financing is probably under­
estimated. 
Source: Computed from Jichisho (Ministry of Local Autonomy}, plus 
adjustments for excluded central government ent. I. 
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As is implici;t:..,ig Table 4 local governments finance only approximately 
half of their consolidated expenditures from within. Their need for external 
funds is great. Most come from the central government, through a complex 
variety of channels. In brief, they are: 
1 automatic allotment of specified 
percentages of certain taxes collected at the central level; 
2 
central govern-
ment grants for specified local expenditures, such as compulsory education, 
health facilities, and disaster relief; central government loans and purchases 
of local government bond issues (mainly from Trust Fund Bureau and postal 
annuity and life insurance funds), usually related to specific investment 
projects; and bond sales to and loans from the private sector and from abroad. 
Only a few large municipalities and prefectures have sufficiently high credit 
ratings to be able to issue bonds publicly. 
The separation of functioµs -- with the central government collecting 
most of the taxes and the local government doing most of the purchases of 
goods and services (inc_luding investment) poses some interesting issues 
of efficien~y. I am not aware of studies of the relative efficiency (cost, 
degree of evasion, etc,) of collection of different kinds of taxes at various 
levels of government, nor of the -relative efficien~y of different types of 
expenditures. 3 I hypothesize that the central government is more efficient 
in collection of most kinds of taxes, due to economies of scale and the ad­
vantages of having identical rates throughout the country. For expend~tures 
1. Ministry•of'Home Affairs, The Local Finance System in Japan. n.d •• 
(1965) 
2. 28.9 percent of personal income, corporation and liquor taxes. 
Allotment, while automatic to local government's as a group, is dis­
cretionary for individual local ·units, depending on their financial needs 
·and local tax base. 




the picture is much less clear, depending greatly on the type of expenditure. 
There is perhaps a presumption of greater efficiency at the central level 
since it is able to attract better human resources. 
Efficiency is not the sole, nor necessarily the most important criterion 
for evaluating central-local relationships. Clearly policital and social 
objectives loom heavily (for example, the desired degree of decentralized 
governmental decision-making, or of voter identification with and participation 
in local politics). Whatever may have been early postwar reform objectives, 
the degree of actual fiscal dependence of local government on central severely 
circumscribes the independent power and decision-making ability at the local 
level. 
III 
The events of·the past few years -- the relative rise in government invest­
ment, the greater relative decline in private demand (as business fixed in­
vestment demand first levelled off, and then declined somewhat, as a per 
cent of GNP), the increased reliance by government on borrowing to pump-
prime and to finance government investment, and the lowering of interest 
rates -- attest to the changes evolving in public-private sector relation­
ships. While some of these represent new trends and new problems, some pro­
bably are of a temporary nature only, and certain old problems are likely 
to come once agaip to the fore. In this section I consider three policy 
issues: the major questions of the financing of future government invest-
ment and of interest rate policy, and the lesser issue of whether the public 
or private sector is entitled to the initial claim on resources generated 
from expansion of central bank credit. My time horizon ·is on the> order of 
5-8 ·years. 
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A basic assumption is that the share of government investment in GNP (and 
in_ gross domes tic investment) will continue to rise somewhat. The lag in 
government social overhead investment has produced a strong pent-up demand 
for public provision of certain consumer services which is being reflected 
through the political process. 1 These pressures are likely to remain extremely 
strong for at least another five years. They will induce a considerable shift 
in the allocation of investment from private production of goods and services 
to public production. Let us examine the nature of these pressures briefly. 
Demand focuses mainly on urban housing and roads, and to some extent on 
urban environmental sanitation (water and sewage systems) The housing shortage 
variously estimated as involving 17-33 per cent of the population -- is a legacy 
of World War II destruction and low priority to housing in the 1950 's. While 
about 90 per cent of housing investment is in the private sector, approximate­
ly one-third of that is government-financed. The need is particularly great 
for relatively low-priced urban dwelling units, an area in which government in­
vestment has concentrated. High urban land prices, high interest rates, need 
for large-scale investment, and lack of private financial institution support2 
on the one.hand, and on the other hand government experience in such large­
scale projects, ability to subsidize through low interest rates and other 
measures, ability to obtain land through condemnation processes, and a feeling 
by citizen and bureaucrat-that housing is a gov~rnmental responsibility --
1. Indeed, the government pl~ns (income doubling between 1961-1970, and 
medium-term for 1964-1968) and, more important, budgets have already been 
responsive to these problem& and no doubt will continue to respond. 
2. This could change fairly rapidly if alternative lending opportunities
dry up and interest rates continue to decline. 
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all argue for a considerably greater government housing investment as well as 
1
finanding program. 
The demand for investment in roads is also very strong, and will rise 
rapidly. It is not limited to consumers. As industries find urban land and 
other production costs rising, they increasingly diversify geographically. Truck 
transport, over even terrible roads, has accordingly grown rapidly and will 
continue. Most important, perhaps, is the growth of the automobile industry 
and reliance upon it as one of the major leading sectors for future growth of 
the economy. Without a substantially better road system than Japan has today, 
the cars to be produced will have no way of being used. 
While such government social overh,'!ad investment will expand rapidly, govern­
ment investment to complement private production more directly will not slow 
down substantially. Further improvements in the national railroads and es­
pecially in harbor faculties are needed. Regional dispersion of industry will 
-generate new demands for government complementary investment. 
The evaluation of the policy issues depends on whether it is assumed 
that demand in the economy is deficient relative to supply capacities, as has 
been true for the past 1-1/2 years, or whether aggregate demand is equal to 
or tendsto exceed supply. In a demand deficient situation a large expansion 
of government spending financed by borrowing is not competitive with private 
sector demand for resources, so a vigorous government investment program has 
little social cost. 
Evaluation of future policy issues has to be in light of the present 
(1965-1966)recession. Its immediate cause was sbuilar to previous recessions: 
restrictive monetary policies were undertaken to restrict investment (and hence 
1. Economic Planning Agency, Economic Survey of Japan, 1964-1965, 
pp. 99-105. 
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aggregate) demand in order to restore balance of payments equilibrium. However, 
the reaction of the economy to the easing of monetary tightness, once the 
balance of payments crisis was over, has been substantially different from 
earlier recessions. Easy money since early 1965 has not set off a business 
fixed investment boom; the overhang of excess capacity and reduced profit mar­
gins has been too great. The government rather quickly recognized the unre­
sponsiveness of private investment demand, and also acted rather quickly, in 
July 1965. However, it underestimated the amount of additional spending that 
was needed to attain reasonably full capacity operation. Hence, its increase 
in demand during 1965 only balanced decreses in private demand; most of the net 
growth in demcmd came from abroad. Preliminary evidence for the spring of 1966 
indicates growing success in government ccmpensatory fiscal measures, but 
output is still considerably below the full capacity level. GNP can grow 
rapidly without substantial new private investment until the capacity limits 
are reached. 
Eventually, however, the very success of compensatory fiscal policy in 
generating aggregate demand to a full capacity level of output will once again 
place the Japanese economy in its postwar pattern of full demand, with the 
attendent financial problems of the past. At that point, any further relative 
increases in government investment (or consumption or transfer payments) will 
have to be at the expense of private demand. 
The Financing of Government Investment 
The rising share of government investment in GNP will probably be financed 
increasingly from external sources, both before and once a full aggregate de­
mand economy is reached. This judgment is based on the following reasoning. 
The government has the objective, though not always achieved, to limit tax 
revenues to 20 per cent of national income. Strong political pressures to con­
tinue the annual practice of reducing tax rates will·make it difficult to 
raise the tax share substantially above 20 per cent. Government current ex-
1penditures are unlikely to fall much relative to GNP. In fact, rising private 
wage rates and increases in the consumer price ·index will place pressure on 
the government to continue to rftise government salaries, so that the government's 
wage bill will probably increase more rapidly than GNP. With constant revenues 
and current expenditures and rising investment relative to GNP, the I-S gap 
will widen, as indeed it already has in 1964-1965; accordingly ·government will 
rely more on borrowed funds. The government will increasingly substitute fi­
nancial for fiscal means of obtaining the saving of the economy. 
The government could try to increase its net foreign borrowing. Aside from 
the fact that at present foreign interest rates are relatively high and funds 
less readily available, it is false economy for a government to borrow abroad 
2simply because the interest rate is lower than do~estic market rates. The 
sole justification for foreign borrowing is to increase the supply of re­
sources available to the economy as reflected in the balance of payments -- to 
1. An only moderate expansion of Japan's defense capabilities, due to 
changing governmental policies as Japan's potential international power is 
perceived and acted upon, would increase government current expenditures 
.substantially. 
2. Foreign borrowing involves a real cost ·in that the interest has to 
be paid in exports, while domestic borrowing involves only a transfer among 
individuals. 
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pay for additional imports, to build up foreign exchange reserves, or to en­
gage in foreign investment. This justification of course has been and will 
continue to be important for Japan. 1 
The government will rely mainly upon domestic borrowing to finance the 
rising I-S gap. Ceteris paribus, government borrowing directly from the central 
bank rather than from the private sector results in a greater increase in ag­
gregate demand because there is no direct decline in private liquidity and 
spending. However, it is analytically useful to examine fiscal and monetary 
policies on a consolidated basis in terms of their overall effects. If the cen-
·tral bank has certain liquidity and expenditure .targets for the private sector 
which it can achieve on its own after taking fiscal actions into account, then 
there is no difference between government borrowing from the private sector 
or from the Bank of Japan. For example, if the government borrows from the 
private sector, the Bank of Jap;m can replenish the liquidity drain by loans 
2to or security purchases fr~m private financial institutions. On the other 
hand, if the gov~rnment were to borrow directly from the Bank of Japan and there­
by to generate excess (inflationary) aggregate demand, the Bank of Japan could. re­
duce private sector liquidity be reducing its loans to the private sector. 
1. For the periods (most of the postwar) in which aggregate demand has been 
strong and the balance of payments a substantial constraint upon even more rapid 
growth, government foreign lending under the export financing program of the Ex­
port-Import Bank of Japan has been rather expensive. It has deprived the economy 
of resources for domestic use or foreign exchange from direct cash sales, and 
has not yet been a net earner of foreign exchange (new loans each year being, 
greater than repayment~) .. Supporters of tnis policy have not demonstrated that,. 
it sufficjently developed new markets not otherwise obtainable or generated new 
technologies and economies of scale in domestic production to have been worth­
while. In recession periods, such as the past 1-1/2 years, the expansion of export 
related loans is socially not very costly; indeed it is one good way to generate 
additional demand. 
-2. This is the present system. The Bank of Japan lends mainly to the pri­
vate sector, and most of the government's borrowing is from the private sector. 
Apparently, the Bank of Japan has in effect underwritten the recent government 
bond issues by informally guaranteeing private financial institutions all the 
liquidity they need, through loans or security purchase. 
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In practice policies are unlikely to be implemented this way. Government 
direct borrowing from the Bank of Japan is probably relatively more expansive, 
especially in periods when the Bank of Japan would prefer not to have liquidity 
eased. The basic reason is that Bank of Japan independence from government 
policy is limited. Past experience with direct borrowing from the Bank of Japan 
by the government and government agencies indicate how powerless the Bank of 
Japan may be in such direct relationships. The law prohibiting direct Bank of 
Japan purchase of government long-term securities seems well justified. 
Whatever restrictive power the Bank of Japan has is more effective against 
private financial institutions. Given its large portfolio of short-term loans 
to banks, the ·Bank of Japan operates from a position of considerable strength. 
It can take the initiative in deciding to restrict credit, Ironically it is 
more effective for the Bank of Japan to hold loans than government securities. 
The imperfections of Japan's capital market, and the polHical and administra­
tive pressures of the government, restrict the Bank of Japan's freedom to en­
gage in open market bond sales for restrictive purposes. 
So long as demand is deficient it does not really matter whether the govern-
.ment borrows from the private sector or from the Bank of Japan. In either case 
Bank of Japan policy supports high liquidity in the private sector. The pro­
blem arises once sufficient demand has been generated through fiscal policy, 
and yet the government needs additional financing to cover a portion of the 
I-S gap. 1 At that point government investment becomes competitive-with pri- • 
vate spending, To prevent inflation, any borrowing to finance government in­
vestment must be offset by reductions in private liquidity to contract private 
spending by an amount equal to the government investment. As argued above, 
1. This presupposes that government investment demand will not be fully
satisfied by the amount of expenditure provided for by compensatory finance. 
There is no particular reason to believe that the I-S gap will always be just
filled by the amount of deficit financing (borrowing) needed to obtain full em­
ployment of resources.This might be the case for a short period, but not pri­once 
vate demand again grows fafrly rapidly. 
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government borrowing from the private sector, without support by the Bank of 
Japan, most nearly achieves this. This is the most efficient way -- aside from 
taxation -- to finance the desired shift of resources to the government from the 
private sector without generating inflation. However, since lending within 
the private sector is mainly to finance investment, government borrowing only 
·transfers saving, while government internal financing from taxation of private 
consumption( through personal iii.come or indirect taxes) increases the economy 1s 
. 1aggregate saving rate. 
Initial Claim on Bank of Japan Credit 
The question of whether the government should borrow from the private sec-
tor or from the Bank of Japan raises .a long-run (non-Keynesian) issue as to 
whether the government or the private sector is entitled to the initial claim2 
on equa1 to t he.; a~Qunt. o f . of B 1 o Japan ered'it. 3 Theresources expans;i.on ant f 
Bank of Japan cumulative credit increase between 1954-1964 was 7.2 per cent of 
the increase in GNP, a note inconsequential claim on resources. 
Of this, the government received 36 per cent, but almost all in 1964. Cen­
tral bank credit has gone mainly to private financial institutions. By redis­
counting rather than lending to the government, the Bank of Japan has delegated 
1. This does not apply to taxes on corporate_profits, since the corporate 
sector has a much higher marginal propensity to save than the government, while 
the household propensity is somewhat lower. 
2. There is, in add"ition, a secondary claim on resources which occurs 
when private financial institutions increase loans and deposits by the multiple
of the initial expansion of 11high-.powered 11 money. This I assume is done by the • 
private financial system. 
3. This issue has becu raised in certain underdeveloped countries such as 
India, where it is argued that the claim on resources represented by an increase 
in currency in circulation (which is one form of financial asset in which the 
priva·te sector puts its saving) should go to the government as non-inflationary 
borrowing from the central bank. 
I 
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·the resource allocation function to the commercial banks rather than to the 
i 
government. This, however, has been mitigated by the private sector lending to 
the government. Indeed, it is misleading to say that the Bank of Japan has not 
allocated its credit to the government; it has, but by the indirect process of 
loans to the private sector and of private sector loans to the government. If 
these transactions had been carried out in competitive market place couldone 
argue that the linkage was rather weak, since the private sector was free to 
choose between private and public debt. But in fact the new issues of local 
governm~nt and public corporation bonds -- the major form of government borrow­
ing through the marketplace -- have been forced ~pon private financial institu­
tions at uncompetitive terms byy government administrative suasion. An implicit 
. arrangement seems to have been that any funds financial institutions used for 
such purposes would be more or less replenished, if indirectly, by Bank of Japan 
loans. 
This suggests that the •issue as to whether government or private sector re­
ceives the initial claim on resour~es by Bank of Japan credit expansion can be 
misleading and is perhaps inconsequential. It is misleading if measurement is 
on the basis solely of the direct flow of credit. It is inconsequential if the 
decision on the public-private decision on the allocation of resources has al­
ready been made and implemented by other fiscal and financial measures. However, 
fiscal..:monetary policy decision-making is not so well articulated and coordinated 
in Japan that ·Bank of .Tapan allocations have no effect. 
Interest Rate Policy 
The prospect of future government investment being financed increasingly 
by borrowing has major implications for policies concerning the level and 
term structure of interest rates. The current levels of •short-term and long~term 
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interests rates are atypical of the postwar period in that many rates on loans 
and bonds are close to or at equilibrium levels. 
Almost all interest rates have been kept abnormally low throughout the 
postwar period by a combination of legal and administrative restraints by the 
Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan. 1 Official short-term rates have 
fluctuated slightly over the course of the cycle, but yields on all new bond 
issues have remained virtually unchanged at artificially low levels for a de­
cade regardless of changes in demand and supply. Evidence on the degree of 
tightness of funds and on market levels of interest rates is provided by the 
actual call market rates and theeffective yields on transactions in bonds sold 
by the Japan·Telephone & Telegraph Company {den-den sai) to new users of tele­
phone services. The call rate has been subject to wide fluctuation {4.75 -
21. 90 per cent for unconditional loam;); the data on average call rates are 
poor, especially for the period June 1957 - 1962 the Bank of Japan applied 
official ceiling rates which were not fully observed. 2 For only brief periods 
of very easy money has the call rate been below official long-term interest 
rates. {Even bank average effective short-term lending rates have tended to 
be above the long-term bond rates). The den-den yields ranged between 7.5 -
15.0 per cent for the period 1958-1965. While the market is narrow, the den-den 
rates probably reflect rather well the level of long-term rates an~ their 
changes. 
1. For greater detail, see Hugh T. Patrick, l'Interest Rates and the Grey
Financial Market in Japan 11 , Pacific Affairs, Winter 1965-66. 
2.The call rate does not correlate well with the Bank of Japan discount
rate; see Hannan Ezekiel, "The Call Money Market in Japan", IHF Staff Papers,
Vol. 13, No. 1 {March 1966). However, Ezekiel uses official statistics rather
than actual call rates. Regressions which I estimated relating the call rate
to growth of GNP (quarterly change over same quarter of the previous year) also
showed little correlation; while estimates of actual call ,rates were used,
they were probably oot very accurate. 
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Only when easy money policies have been pursued (notably in recessions) 
have short-term rates gone substantially below officially-determined long-term 
rates. The disastrous easy money policy of 1963 to reduce short-term interest 
rates sufficiently below long-term rates to establish a market .equilibrium 
term structure should serve as warning to those who anticipate that a market­
determined level and structure of rates is always consistent with a low interest 
rate policy. The money supply increased 17 per cent (seasonally adjusted 1) in 
the first half of 1963 and 27 per cent for the year. This creation of money 
did bring the call rate down from a 1962 tight money peak of about 14 per cent 
to a 1963 low of 7.3 per cent and the den-den rate from 14.016 per cent to 8.440 
per cent (still well above offical rates.). It also generated high corporate 
liquidity, a new round of expenditures, and an abortive boom leading to renewed 
balance of payments problems. Of course call and den-den rates once again rose 
as the boom developed. 
The present situation is different from 1963 in that private demand for 
funds and for investment is relatively slack while monetary policy is and can 
be easy, so that equilibrium as well as officia,l interest rates have declined 
to postwar lows, so that a market level and structure of rates is being approxi­
mated. This offers the policy-makers a real opportunity to establish viable 
and strong capital and money markets by ending the restrictions on interest 
rates and market transactions. 
2 
1. Adjusted also for the surfacing of hidden loans (fukimi kashidashi)
and hidden deposits. 
2. The arguments concerning the resource allocation and welfare bene­
fits of reliance on markets and prices (interest rates) for fund allocation in
place of controls· are well-known and are not repeated here. 
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The sale to the private sector of central government bonds in early 1966 
for 1 
I 
the first time since 1947, and at a yield (6.795. per cent) attractive in 
relatively liquid financial markets, provides a good vehicle for establishing 
real issue and secondary markets in debentures. Apparently individual pur­
chasers have been guaranteed a high degree of liquidity for their bonds. This 
implies either an active market for government bonds or some form of under­
writing ultimately, I suspect, by the Bank of Japan. The decision to sell 
government bonds had to overcome a large psychological block in Japan, since 
it ended the fiction that the government maintains a balanced budget and does 
1 
not borrow on more than a seasonal basis . Some fear lingers that governme_nt 
bond issue must lead to inflation -- a sirnpU.stic and misleading view. 
2 
If government bonds lead the way to a relatively free market in all kinds 
of financial assets, considerable adjustments among rates will take place both 
in the short-run and long-run, __ In the short-run, the most important adjust­
ment could be between government bonds and financial institution savings and 
time deposit r8tes. If bonds are highly liquid arid maintain their present 
1. As we have seen (Table 3) this is a fiction because the govern­
ment has been a net borrower almost every year. However, the borrowing was 
in a sense disguised (postal saving, local governments, public corporations); 
it was, and is, possible to maintain a surplus in the general account with 
-- overall central government deficits, since it covers only a part of central 
government expenditures. 
2. However, it may not be unreasonable to think that once the gove·rnment 
begins government bond-financed deficit spending it will not stop even when 
aggregate demand is sufficient. On the other hand, restriction of governmen~ 
bond issue does not guarantee that fiscal policy will result in price stability. 
For example, if private demand were relatively strong, the government could 
readily generate inflationary pressures (as perhaps in 1963 and 1964) without 
government bond issues by financing a widening I-S gap through increased local 
government and public corporation bond issue, and use of government financial' 
institutions to finance government rather than private investrr~nt. 
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yield considerably abo\re deposit rates, individuals will be induced to switch 
' 1
from deposits to bonds. Substantial switching would put competitive pressure 
on banks to raise deposit rates. This would be healthy; depositers now subsi­
dize big business borrowers. An increase in bank deposit rates in turn would 
2generate pressure to raise postal savings deposits rates. 
The longer-run effects of a market-determined level and structure of in­
terest · rates have far greater implications. It is useful to distinguish 
between two phases: the present with inadequate aggregate demand, and that 
period in the future when successful fiscal policy restores the economy to 
3the high aggregate demand condition prevalent throughout the postwar period. 
As deficit,_spending progresses, the economy will move continuously from the 
first into the second phase. 
The first phase, until its later stages, will not pose serious interest 
rate problems. Rates will rise only slightly above present levels, since 
1. Much of course depends on expectations concerning bond prices. I 
would not be surprised to see develop a de facto floor price, as apparently 
exists at present, being supported directly by the monetary authorities 
or indirectly by forcing financial institutions to support the market by 
purchases. 
2. The government can justify postal savings rates somewhat below govern­
ment bend yields on grounds on convenience and divisibility. 
3. While pump-priraing may be needed for a year or two because of a 
show-down in business ir>.vestment, I anticipate a new round of expanded business 
investr!lent thereafter, in substantial part due to the very success of fiscal 
policy. Of course the increase in private demand does not have to come from 
business investment; the only necessary condition is that it come from some­
where in the private sector. I ~ssume that, while bothered by -continued ris~s 
in consumer prices, the government will still place sufficient emphasis on full 
use of resources and growth to take the fiscal actions necessary to generate a 
fairly high level of demand (though perhaps below that of the 1961-1964 level). 
Finance Minister FaKuda feels a 7-8 per cent growth rate is feasible, and that 
deficit financing will have to continue vigorously for three years before 
slacking off. See 11 Sato Government's Fiscal Policy--FdKuda-Higo Forum on 
Fiscal Problems," Oriental Economist, April 1966. 
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the Bank of Japan will continue to support compensatory fiscal_ policy with easy 
money policy. However, as the rise in demand moyes the economy unto the 
second phase, financial markets will begin to tighten and market-determined in­
terest rates will begin to rise. 1 
In the second phase -- when the Japanese economy is once again in a boom, 
with demand pressing against supply capacities -- government spending (in­
vestment) will once again be competitive with private spending. Fiscal-monetary 
policy will have to end its ease to forestall the emergence of inflationary 
and balance of payment problems. With financial markets accordingly tight, in­
terest rates will rise substantially. Because few financial markets have been 
free, past experience provides little information as to how high market-de-
\ 
termined short-term and long-term interest rates would rise. The call and 
den-den rates are indicators, but their markets are narrow, so that they probably 
exaggerate the magnitude of changes. Call rate data are poor arid do not corre­
late well with other variables~ 
Den-den rates (D)", lagged six months, regressed on the rate of growth of 
GNP over the same quarter for the previous year provide the following results. 




d = 1.6625 
1. This tightening may come sooner than anticipated. Apparently there 
was some difficulty in selling the individuals' allotment for April 1966; 
securities fir~s are repurchasing individuals' bonds at a slight discount be­
. low issue price, with the effective yield increasing to 6.87 per cent. 
2. Fitted only to the upswing phase the results are: 
2D = 7.37 + 0.1616 GNP_2 R = .517 
(0 .0391) d = 0.6932 
While providing greater explanation, the 1\)urban-Hatson statistic indicates 
an autocorrelation problem. 
In other words a 10 percentage point increase in the quarterly growth rate 
would increase the den-den rate by 1.73 percentage points. Quarterly growth 
rates vary much more widely than annual rates, ranging between -7.3 and 26.1 
per cent. Whatever evidence we have does suggest a considerable rise in martcet­
equilibrium interest rates in a boom from present levels. 
The important question is how will the government respond to an increase 
in the general level of interest rates, and in particular to the price de­
cline of outstanding government bonds and the higher requisite yield for new 
government bond issues. Will the government allow the market forces to work 
themselves out in higher interest rates? Or- will the government restore con­
trols over interest rates (especially long-term rates), set rates low relative 
to their equilibrium level, try to halt trading in bonds, and once again 
emasculate the nascent capital -market? What alternative paths are open to 
the government? 
One alternative wo~ld be to have the Bank of Japan support the bond 
market by direct or indirect purchases (loans to financial institutions on 
condition they support the bond market). This would clearly be inflationary, 
and eventually self-defeating. I regard it unlikely as a major action, 
though interim support may occur. 
A second would be for the government to have a more restrictive fiscal 
policy by increasing the share of taxes in GNP or, more politically likely, 
by reducing government expenditures, notably investment. This would both 
apply the necessary restriction to demand and reduce the government's need 
to borrow. But much depends on the size of the I-S gap and the government 
decision as to whether its investment program should be carried through. 
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It is very likely that a full demand condition will be restored before the 
government has built sufficient houses, roads, waterworks, harbors, etc. The 
government may be unwilling to restrict its investment program (reduce the 
government's share of total resources) sufficiently for purposes of compensa­
tory finance. 
A third alternative is for the government to continue its investment pro­
gram, and to finance the 1-S gap .by competing with private borrowers in the 
private sector market for funds. It would, in effect, bid away resources from 
private users. This, plus appropriately restrictive monetary policy, would 
offset the increases in demand generated by the government investment expendi­
ture, It ~ould have the advantage of allowing money and capital markets to flour­
ish and of interest rates to carry out their proper allocative functions. 
One argument against.allowing the level of interest rates to rise is 
that it would palce a higher interest rate burden on the government. This is 
a false argument, for a variety of reasons. Indeed, for any given amount of 
liquidity in the private sector as determined by central bank policy, at the 
margin government borrowing is at zero net cost to the government whether from 
the private sector or from the Bank of Japan, whether at the high interest 
rates or low. Theteason is that increased profits of the Bank of Japan from 
increased interest receipts are transferred to the government. Any amount of 
government borrowing from the private sector has to be matched by equivalent 
Bank of Japan loans to the private sector, if the given level _of private 
sector liquidity is to be maintained. I assume that the government borrow­
rate from the private sector is at essentially the same level as the Bank of 
Japan r.ediscount rate, so that what it pays out as interest it receives as 
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Bank of Japan profits, 1 If the government were to borrow directly from the 
Bank of Japan and thereby through its expenditures generate excess private 
demand, the Bank of Japan wouuld have to reduce its loans to the private sec­
tor by an equivalent amount. 
This indeed is a fourth possibility. Fiscal policy under this circum­
stance would continue to be expansive. The system would rely even more upon the 
Bank of Japan than it has ~n the past fifteen years to reduce credit to the 
private sector by ti~1t money measures sufficiently to absorb the government­
generated excess demand. The Bank of Japan is unlikely to accomplish such a 
policy adequately, The result would be inflation. Probably the laws re­
stricting government direct borrowing from the Bank of Japan will not be 
chanced, in which case this really is not an alternative. 
The government would not be happy with a price decline substantially be­
low par in its already issued bonds, and would be reluctant to see its interest 
cost of funds much raised. The government arguments appear to be founded on 
bookkeeping, legalistic, and status, pride, or otherpsychological criteria 
rather than on economic reasoning. Thus, the final alternative is that the 
government will restore interest rate ceilings and other controls in order 
to keep interest rates below equilibrium levels. In other words, the govern­
ment will revert to the control system used throughout the postwar period. 
Credit rationing and administrative guidance would once again force private 
financial institutions (and to some extent indirectly the Bank of Japan) to. 
finance the government's borrowing at artificially low interest rates. For 
reasons of prestige, the government might well discontinue financing the I-S 
1. If the government bond rate were below the central bank lending
rate the government would actually make a small net profit. 
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gap with government bond issues, but instead issue local government and· public 
~orporation bond's and, by shifting flows through government finaricial.inter­
mediaries to finance government investment, divert pas tal savings .and life 
in.surance more into government investment. While this too will sop up private 
funds, reliance will also have to'be placed upon. Bank of Japan restrictive 
credit policies. If this alternative were selected, the nascent capital market 
would once again ,..tither away, and the efficacy of interest rates in the alloca­
tion process would be reduced. 
Which among, these alternatives will the government choose when the success 
of present fiscal policy restores growth, and market-determined interest 
rates rise? My prediction is_ that wqile the government will make marginal 
adjustments among the first four alternatives to reduce the aggregate demand 
pressure, its main adjustment will be to restore administrative controls over 
financial markets and ceilings on interest rates. The attempt to establish 
a real long-term capital market and a market-determined structure of interest 
rates will be aborted. Perhaps the most interesting question is how high --
7 per cent?, 7-1/2 per cent? -- will the government allow the market yield 
on government bonds to rise before it clamps on controls once again. 
